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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
AUDRA LYNN HAIRSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48234-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR-01-20-6929
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1.

Has Hairston failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed a unified sentence of five years with two years fixed for methamphetamine
possession, and suspended the sentence and placed Hairston on probation?

2.

Has Hairston failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by denying
her I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence?

3.

Has Hairston failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by revoking
probation, imposing the original sentence, and retaining jurisdiction?

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In February 2020, an officer observed a vehicle with an expired registration drive into
and park in a Meridian Rite Aid parking lot.

(PSI, p.7. 1) The officer approached the vehicle

and made contact with Audra Hairston and another individual. (Id.) Hairston told officers that
she was homeless and was planning on sleeping in the vehicle, which was borrowed, for the
night. (Id.) Hairston denied that there was anything illegal in the vehicle, and stated that she had
not used illegal drugs since she was 17. (Id.) Another officer arrived with a drug detection dog,
which alerted on the vehicle. (Id.) A subsequent vehicle search revealed a purse containing
methamphetamine and several syringes. (PSI, pp.7, 15.) The purse also contained a prescription
pill bottle with Hairston’s name on it. (PSI, p.7.)
The state charged Hairston with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp.27-28.)

Pursuant to an agreement with the state, Hairston pled guilty to

methamphetamine possession and the state dismissed the paraphernalia charge. (5/4/20 Tr., p.7,
L.5 – p.20, L.5.) The state agreed to recommend probation, and a suspended unified five-year
sentence with one year fixed. (5/4/20 Tr., p.7, Ls.18-22.) Also at this hearing, the district court
granted the state’s motion to revoke Hairston’s bond due to numerous violations of Hairston’s
pretrial release conditions – including failing to appear for required UAs, positive UA tests, and
falsely reporting that she was living at the City of Lights facility. (R., pp.56-61, 92; 5/4/20 Tr.,
p.21, L.12 – p.27, L.20.) The court ordered Hairston to report to jail by the end of the week, and
expressed hope that Hairston would attempt to start available jail treatment programs while she
was detained. (5/4/20 Tr., p.27, L.21 – p.28, L.9.)
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Citations to page numbers of the PSI refer to page numbers of the electronic file containing the
PSI.
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Between the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing, Hairston continued to
violate her pretrial release conditions. While Hairston initially reported to jail as ordered, the jail
did not yet possess the district court order revoking her bond. (See 7/13/20 Tr., p.32, Ls.15-22.)
The jail booked and released her. (See id.) Upon obtaining the order, the jail called Hairston
and told her to return, but she did not do so. (See id.) She also failed to report to jail upon later
being instructed to do so by her probation officer. (See 7/13/20 Tr., p.32, L.23 – p.33, L.3.)
Additionally, Hairston failed to report for numerous required UAs, tested positive following
another UA, and failed to return the pretrial case manager’s phone calls. (See 7/13/20 Tr., p.33,
Ls.4-11; see also R., pp.126-127.)
As a result of these failures to comply with pretrial release conditions, the state requested
that it be released from the sentencing recommendations associated with the plea agreement.
(7/13/20 Tr., p.32, L.2 – p.34, L.4.) The district court granted this request – while noting that it
would likely sentence “outside the plea agreement” regardless of whether the state was permitted
to change its recommendation. (7/13/20 Tr., p.34, L.18 – p.36, L.5.) The state recommended a
unified five-year sentence with two years fixed, and for the court to retain jurisdiction. (7/13/20
Tr., p.36, L.12 – p.39, L.8.) Hairston requested that the court place her on probation. (7/13/20
Tr., p.39, L.11 – p.42, L.4.) The district court imposed a unified five-year sentence with two
years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Hairston on probation as she requested.
(7/13/20 Tr., p.44, L.8 – p.45, L.18.) As a term of probation, the court ordered Hairston to report
to jail the next day and serve 120 days – but that she would eligible for early release if she
completed specified jail programming. (7/13/20 Tr., p.45, Ls.8-18; p.49, Ls.6-19.)
Hairston did not report to jail as ordered. (R., p.146; see also Aug. R., p.3.) A warrant
was issued and Hairston was arrested. (R., p.146; see also Aug. R., p.3.) Despite this, and
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despite not having completed the ordered jail treatment programs, Hairston filed an I.C.R. 35(b)
motion for reduction of sentence with supporting documents. (R., pp.151, 157-158, 167-178.)
The district court denied the motion without a hearing. (Aug. R., pp.1-5.)
While Hairston’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion was pending, the state filed a report of probation
violation.

(R., pp.160-163.)

The state alleged that Hairston violated her probation by:

committing a new misdemeanor crime, failing to report to jail as ordered, failing to report to her
supervising officer, failing to make herself available for supervision and program participation,
and failing to pay fines and fees. (Id.) Hairston admitted to violating her probation by failing to
report to jail as ordered, and the state agreed to dismiss the other allegations. (10/19/20 Tr., p.6,
L.17 – p.13, L.15.)
At the subsequent disposition hearing, the state joined with the Department of Correction
in recommending that the district court impose the original sentence and retain jurisdiction.
(11/23/20 Tr., p.16, Ls. 17-25.) Hairston requested another opportunity on probation with the
condition she complete Ada County Drug Court. (11/23/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.8-12.) The district
court ordered the originally imposed sentence to be executed and retained jurisdiction. (11/23/20
Tr., p.26, Ls.1-24; Aug R., pp.7-10.) Hairston timely appealed. (R., pp.152-154.)
ARGUMENT
I.
Hairston Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Hairston contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive

sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8.) She also contends that the court abused its discretion by
imposing a probation term of 120 days jail time. (Id.) However, a review of the record reveals
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that the district court’s suspended unified five-year sentence with two years fixed, and
accompanying probation terms, were reasonable in light of Hairston’s criminal history and
failure to comply with the terms of pretrial release.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,
577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). The
trial court’s decision to impose a particular term of probation is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977); ---------see also State v.
Cross, 105 Idaho 494, 495-96, 670 P.2d 901, 902-903 (1983).
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (citing
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
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Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the
period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In deference to the trial judge,
this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might
differ.’” State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
In this case, prior to imposing sentence, the district court cited the appropriate sentencing
factors. (7/13/20 Tr., p.43, Ls.4-12.) Noting its concern about Hairston’s ability to be successful
on probation without first engaging in some type of programming, the court, while granting
Hairston’s request that she be placed on probation, elected to impose 120 days jail as a term of
that probation, and to suspend a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed. (7/13/20 Tr.,
p.43, L.17 – p.45, L.18.)

A review of the record supports the district court’s sentencing

determination.
While this was Hairston’s first felony conviction, she has a history of misdemeanor
convictions – including for DUI. (PSI, pp.48-50.) More troublingly, Hairston was charged (and
ultimately convicted), of a second DUI just a week before her arrest in the present case. (PSI,
pp.49-50.) By the time of her sentencing on the methamphetamine charge, Hairston was on
probation in the DUI case. (PSI, p.50.) Her DUI probation officer reported that Hairston’s
performance on probation was “deplorable” – in that she was not amenable to supervision, and
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had a pending probation violation for missing meetings, failing to appear for required UAs,
lying, and continuing to use methamphetamine. (Id.) As this same time, as noted above,
Hairston was also failing to comply with the terms of her pretrial release on the
methamphetamine case. (See 7/13/20 Tr., p.33, Ls.4-11; ----see also R., pp.122-128.) The district
court noted that while it would not release the state from the terms of the plea agreement based
upon “one or two” violations, in this case, “the number of violations is breathtaking in terms of
complete lack of compliance.” (7/13/20 Tr., p.34, L.18 – p.35, L.4.)
Hairston scored a 33.0 on the LSI-R, placing her in the “high” risk to re-offend category.
(PSI, p.58.) Both the prosecutor and the presentence investigator recommended that the district
court retain jurisdiction. (7/13/20 Tr., p.36, L.12 – p.39, L.8; PSI, p.59.) The presentence
investigator opined that “[t]his option would provide a stable and structured environment where
Ms. Hairston can participate in treatment to her address her substance abuse and thinking errors,
as well as continue her mental health treatment.” (PSI, p.59.)
The 120 days jail ordered by the court as a term of probation came about as a result of a
reasoned decision-making process.

The court explained that in light of her demonstrated

inability to comply with pretrial release conditions, "Ms. Hairston needs time away from her
current environment, to be in a controlled environment free from alcohol and drugs for some
sustained period of time, and needs programming.” (7/13/20 Tr., p.43, Ls.17-24.) Further, the
court ordered that upon completion of specified classes available at the Ada County Jail,
Hairston would be eligible, at the discretion of the Ada County Sheriff, for early release.
(7/13/20 Tr., p.45, Ls.7-18.)

Thus, despite the prosecutor’s and presentence investigator’s

recommendations that it retain jurisdiction, the court instead fashioned a sentence that provided
Hairston an earlier opportunity for probation.
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On appeal, Hairston does not take issue with any of the stated rationale set forth by the
court for its sentencing determinations, but instead asserts the existence of certain mitigating
factors. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.) However, nothing in the record indicates that the district
court failed to consider any of these things, or chose to disregard the evidence of these factors
presented in the presentence investigation report and Hairston’s sentencing argument. Instead, it
is clear that even after Hairston’s continuous failures to comply with the terms of her pretrial
release (and the terms of her DUI probation), the court viewed Hairston as a potential candidate
for community supervision, and attempted to place Hairston in the best position to succeed on
such supervision.
Hairston has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
This Court should therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.
II.
Hairston Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
Her I.C.R. 35(b) Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
Hairston contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her I.C.R. 35(b)

motion for reduction of sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-10.) However, a review of the record
reveals that the court acted well within its discretion to deny the motion because its original
sentence was not rendered excessive by the supporting materials submitted by Hairston.
B.

Standard Of Review
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”
P.3d 381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015).

State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415

Where a sentence is neither illegal nor excessive when
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pronounced, “the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion.” State v.
Burggraf, 160 Idaho 177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Huffman, 144 Idaho at
203, 159 P.3d at 840).

As noted above, in evaluating whether a lower court abused its

discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Herrera, 164 Idaho at 272,
429 P.3d at 160 (citing Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d at 194.)
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny Hairston’s I.C.R. 35(b)
Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
In its memorandum decision denying Hairston’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of

sentence, the court cited and applied the relevant law consistent with that set forth above, and
accurately summarized the course of the proceedings to that point. (Aug. R., pp.1-3.) The court
reasonably concluded that Hairston was not entitled to a reduction of sentence in light of her
failures to comply with the terms of probation and pretrial release. (Aug. R., pp.3-4.) A review
of the record supports this determination.
Between the July 13, 2020 sentencing hearing and the district court’s September 30, 2020
order denying Hairston’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence, Hairston failed to report
to jail to begin serving the ordered 120 days jail time, was alleged by the state to have violated
her probation in that and numerous other respects, and failed to participate in the ordered jail
treatment that the court had emphasized as a critical part of its prior sentencing determination.
(See R., pp.146, 160-163; Aug. R., pp.3-4.)

9

In light of these circumstances, the district court was not required to reduce Hairston’s
sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b). The materials submitted by Hairston in support of her motion
(a letter asserting that she would move to Hailey upon her release, where she has more support;
documents indicating that some of her prescribed medications were not available to her in jail,
and a letter indicating she had been accepted into a sober living facility), do not change these
circumstances or the analysis of the district court’s discretionary decision. This is particularly
evident considering the district court’s subsequent decision to revoke probation and retain
jurisdiction. A review of the district court’s decisions made throughout the underlying criminal
proceeding reflect a thoughtful rehabilitative-based approach that aimed to provide Hairston the
best opportunity to succeed.
Hairston failed to demonstrate in her I.C.R. 35(b) motion and supporting materials that
her sentence was excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, Hairston has failed to
establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying her I.C.R. 35(b) motion. This
Court should therefore affirm the district court’s denial order.
III.
Hairston Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking
Probation, Imposing The Original Sentence, And Retaining Jurisdiction
A.

Introduction
Hairston finally contends that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her

probation, imposing the original sentence, and retaining jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp.1013.) However, a review of the record reveals that the district court acted well within its
discretion in determining that after repeated failures to abide by the terms of pretrial release and
two separate criminal probations, the retained jurisdiction program was the most appropriate next
step in this proceeding.
10

B.

Standard Of Review
“‘[T]he decision whether to revoke a defendant’s probation for a violation is within the

discretion of the district court.’” State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017)
(quoting State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)). In
determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 797, 302 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted). A
decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court
abused its discretion. Id. at 798, 302 P.3d at 1071 (citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326,
834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992)).
C.

Hairston Failed To Show Her Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New Information
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Hairston’s probation,

imposed the underlying sentence, and retained jurisdiction. In reviewing the propriety of a
probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).
“In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is meeting
the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.” State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). If the court
reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation is not achieving its
rehabilitative purpose, then probation may be revoked. See Mummert, 98 Idaho at 454-455, 566
P.2d at 1112-1113. Contrary to Hairston’s assertions on appeal, the record shows the district
court did not abuse its discretion in revoking her probation.
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When the court initially placed Hairston on probation (contrary to the recommendations
of the prosecutor and the presentence investigator), it stated that its hope was that Hairston would
take part in treatment in jail and then do well on probation. (7/13/20 Tr., p.44, Ls.17-22.) The
court added that “[i]f that doesn’t work,” and “if the next logical step is a rider,” there would still
be enough fixed time to craft such a sentence. (7/13/20 Tr., p.44, L.23 – p.45, L.3.) The court
specifically imposed two fixed years, instead of one, in part to prepare for this possibility, and to
“give the defendant a chance at rehabilitation.” (7/13/20 Tr., p.44, L.17 – p.45, L.3.)
Hairston subsequently violated her probation by failing to report to jail, and thus deprived
herself of the jail programming that was a critical factor underlying the district court’s sentencing
determination. (R., p.146; See
- -also
- - Aug. R., p.3.) Further, as noted above, by the time of her
sentencing in this case, Hairston was already non-compliant with a separate DUI probation.
(PSI, p.50.) Hairston also failed to report to her felony probation officer, was charged with false
personation, and failed to participate in the jail treatment programs when finally detained. (See
11/23/20 Tr., p.17, L.11 – p.18, L.24; R., pp.160-164.)
While Hairston, as she emphasizes on appeal, had been approved for drug court by the
time of the disposition hearing (See 11/23/20 Tr., p.15, Ls.21-24), it was reasonable for the
district court to be skeptical about Hairston’s ability to succeed in such a program at that time
(11/23/20 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-25). As the court explained:
I have significant concerns, Miss Hairston, that you would be successful
on drug court. My experience has been that you will say -- you are a long-term
drug addict. I saw you’re
years old. You have a meth addiction going back to
the time you were , so a very long-term drug addiction. Drug court can actually
help people with long-term drug addiction issues, and that’s not a disqualifier.
That’s, in fact, one of the things they’re really good at. But given your conduct
on pretrial [release] that created -- worried the Court, your failure to appear -- or
failure to turn yourself in as required, your failure to complete the jail classes, and
my general observation of this case as a whole, and reviewing the case as a whole
indicates that I don't think you can comply with the rules at this point. And being
12

able to comply with rules is an essential element of being successful in drug court.
So I think maybe drug court could be in the future here, but there needs to be
programming, education, rehabilitation, before I would think that drug court
would be appropriate.
(Id.)
The district court’s decision not to provide Hairston an additional opportunity for
probation, and to instead utilize the rider program, was entirely reasonable.

Hairston has

therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Hairston’s judgment of conviction; the
district court’s order denying Hairston’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion; and the district court’s decision to
revoke probation, impose the original sentence, and retain jurisdiction.
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2021.
/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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